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This article explores the Americanisation of food retailing in Spain while making a 
running comparison with developments in Britain and more especially, within the 
development of self-service techniques. This international comparison helps to ascertain 
the evolution and modernisation of food retailing in two distinct competitive 
environments. The aim of this study is to understand how Americanisation and retail 
innovation take place in a late-comer like Spain in the early stages of the self-service 
revolution. The comparison between Spain and the UK facilitates how different starting 
points favoured differentiated entrepreneurial options which, finally led to similar 
positions or modes of development. The Americanization of Spanish retailing is 
assessed against the backdrop of developments elsewhere in Europe. New archival 
evidence allows us to highlight specific aspects of the path to the Spanish modernization 
of food distribution. In addition to American aid, there were other elements that were 
crucial to the modernization process, chief among these being the contacts between 
Spanish and European businessmen and the influence of voluntary chains of 
cooperation. 
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Interpreting the Early Stages of the Self-service 
Revolution in Europe: the Modernization of Food 




In a large part of Western Europe, after the Second World War, a process of, what has 
become known as, “Americanization” took place. The implications of the process were 
wide-ranging, particularly from the economic and sociological point of view (Bjarnar 
and Kipping, 1998; Zeitlin, 2000). This move enjoyed the organisational and financial 
support provided by the US Technical Assistance and Productivity Programme 
(USTAPP), under the auspices of the European Recovery Plan. Western European aid 
policy came into effect after 1947. 
The degree of implementation and the extent of the changes that were brought 
about via North American aid were highly diverse. So too were governmental policy, 
the response of businesses and the extent to which civil society took on board the new 
patterns of conduct that were particularly influential with respect to consumer behaviour 
(Zeitlin, 2000; Shaw, Curth, Alexandre, 2004). This article attempts to study certain 
aspects of this diversity, focusing upon the implementation of Self-service retailing and 
how this progressed in the supermarkets. The two pillars of this approach therefore, are 
the main innovations that transformed food retailing and the way in which people 
shopped for food in post-war Europe.  
The process by which self service shopping began in Europe varied greatly across 
the continent. At the end of the 1950’s the number of newly created establishments 
began to grow. In 1960 there were three groups of countries which differed with respect 
to the extent to which they had adopted the self service philosophy. The initial group 
contained the seven most highly advanced countries of which Sweden and Norway were 
the most prominent (see Sandgren, 2009). Sweden and Norway, on average, had one 
self service outlet for every 1 564 and 2 043 inhabitants respectively. These countries 
were followed by Germany, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark and finally Great Britain, 
the latter having one establishment per 8 883 inhabitants1. The second group contained 
three countries (Austria, France and Belgium), in which the self service concept had just 
begun to take off. On average, these countries had a customer base of between 15 000 
and 32 000 inhabitants. Finally, and lagging some way behind, there were a further 
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three countries where self service outlets barely existed at all: Ireland, Spain and Italy, 
in which there was one self service outlet for every 93 000, 97 000 and 180 000 
inhabitants respectively2. 
In the British model, the main agents involved in the development of self-service 
outlets were, firstly, the cooperatives straight after WW2, and then the multiple retailers 
(McClelland, 1962; Shaw, Curth, Alexandre, 2004; Alexandre, 2008)3. New archival 
evidence has allowed analysts to highlight specific aspects of the Spanish route to the 
modernization of food distribution. Together with American aid, which was finally 
implemented in the 50’s, there were genuinely novel elements to the modernization 
process. One of these was the role of Latin American businessmen (Cubans and 
Mexicans) who had emigrated to Spain and were well versed in the nuances of North 
American retailing. Contacts with European businessmen were to play a key role in 
modernization, particularly with respect to certain voluntary chains such as SPAR. The 
backdrop to Spanish modernization was characterized by an acute lack of capital and 
the need for both entrepreneurs and consumers to take on board a wealth of changes. In 
addition, the institutional framework during the early years of the Franco dictatorship 
was far from conducive to the successful implantation of these changes. 
In this article I explore the Americanization of food retailing in Spain while making 
a running comparison with developments in Britain and more especially, within the 
development of self-service techniques. One of the main aims of this paper is to 
understand how this retail innovation was implemented by Spanish retailers and how 
they attempted to improve retail efficiency and provide benefits for the consumer. This 
international comparison helps to ascertain the way in which the modernisation of food 
retailing in two distinct competitive environments evolved. With this in mind, an 
attempt is made to understand how the process of Americanization and retail innovation 
developed in a late-comer like Spain in the early stages of the self-service revolution. 
This analysis takes place against a historical backdrop of historical isolation for Spain as 
a consequence of the civil war (1936-1939) a period that was immediately followed by 
marginalization by the allies as a consequence of the Franco dictatorship after WW2. 
The comparison between Spain and the UK facilitates the analysis of how two 
completely different starting points favoured differentiated business models which, 
would finally lead to similar situations and stages of development.  
The research presented here draws on two main sources. Firstly, a reading of the 
retail trade press, and in particular the journal Sparco, a review which was published by 
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the Spanish branch of SPAR (SPAR Española S.A) for the first time in 1959. For more 
than a decade it was one of the few vehicles of sectorial information in Spain. It set the 
pattern for other publications such as Distribución Actualidad (Distribution Today) in 
the 70’s and later, key publications in the sector such as Anuario de la Distribución, 
(Annual Journal of Distribution), Nielsen Anuario de Evolución, (The Nielsen Annual 
Journal of Distribution Development), Alimarket, (Food Markets) Distribución y 
Consumo, (Distribution and Consumption) etc. Secondly, the analysis uses a novel 
business resource, one which belongs to an influential regional family firm group, the 
Agrupación Alimentaria VEGONSA, which is today, the Galician partner of the Eroski 
cooperative, one of the leading Spanish food distributors. The initial phase of 
development of the company involved the organisation of voluntary chains, which 
subsequently gave rise to an independent policy similar to that of other multiple retailers 
in Spain. Finally, the literature available with respect to the British case facilitates a 
measured comparison within the framework established for the analysis. The period that 
provides the setting for the analysis begins in 1947 with the establishment of North 
American aid, and ends in 1972 prior to the inauguration of the first French 
hypermarket in Barcelona. 
This paper proceeds as follows; the second section looks at the exacerbation in the 
delay to Spanish modernization during the early Franco years. The third section looks at 
the Americanization of the Spanish food trade. The fourth analyzes the key role played 
by the voluntary chains and fifth provides a few salient conclusions.  
 
2. Developmental  Retardation and the Early Franco Years 
There is general agreement in the literature that the 1940’s and part of the 50’s in Spain 
were years of isolation, hunger, and a dearth of  economic planning. Food policy was 
governed by criteria that ignored market conditions. The result was that there was an 
officially imposed system of prices, a lack of supply, and rising demand that gave rise to 
unofficial markets4. Most governmental regulation aimed to establish and control the 
rationing systems, created by the General Commission for Supplies and Transport 
(Comisaría General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, in Spanish (CAT), Ley de 10 
March 1939)5. The isolation of the regime and the international economic situation 
during the post war years together with the autarky were factors that were especially 
prejudicial to the food sector which, in turn, had an impact on distribution. In contrast to 
the policies that were actively being carried out by the British government and other 
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European neighbours, those of the dictatorship did little to provide incentives to reduce 
the costs of distribution and, by extension, productivity. 
There were signs of changes on the horizon after 1947 when the North American 
point of view became more flexible and led to the expansion of private trade, facilitating 
the arrival of financial aid. By the 1950’s the position of North America had changed. 
The U.S. congress and the Truman administration together with the ‘Spanish lobby’ 
helped to pass legislation that was to deliberately favour Spanish economic 
development. The amendment underlined “the need to try and improve the standard of 
living of the Spanish population and to ensure the country was in a position to resist the 
threat of communism”6.  
In fact, 1951 was a turning point in the structure of Spanish consumer spending. 
From 1943, private spending on food products, drinks and tobacco had increased as an 
overall proportion of consumer spending and GDP at market prices. In 1951 it reached 
an all time high of 50% with respect to GDP. From then onwards there began a sharp 
decline which, in 1956, saw this percentage fall to 14 points below the 1951 level. If the 
correction which took place between 1957 and 1959 is excluded, it may be concluded 
that, from 1951 onwards, the weight of food, drink and tobacco consumption, both as a 
proportion of private spending and as a proportion of GDP, began to follow a trend in 
spending which is still current. In short, there was and has been a progressive decline in 
the weight of this expenditure7. Of course, in the 1950’s in Spain the structure of 
Spanish spending with respect to national income was disproportionately biased 
towards food, simply because of the relative backwardness of the Spanish economy and 
low levels of national income. 
The definitive change for Spain came about in September 1953 when the Madrid 
Pact was signed, initiating agreements with the US. The arrival of international aid and 
the way in which US aid was implemented served to stimulate entrepreneurial 
expectations8. To a certain extent these changes had a tangible effect on Spanish 
retailing in that, after 1952, food outlets were once again teeming with produce and 
perishable goods and rationing was abandoned9. However, while rationing was indeed 
abolished in both the UK and Spain around this time, the situation in Spain was 
precarious since the standard of living was extremely low and scarcity was an integral 
part of daily life. The private sector had still not really taken off and the government 
lacked the impetus needed to promote new ways out of the developmental slough. In the 
UK on the other hand, there were many variations of self service outlets and these were 
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constantly on the rise, a feature of British consumer society that provided a dynamic 
stimulus to the business sector which placed it far ahead of its Spanish counterpart (in 
1950 the Self-service Development Association and the journal Self-service were both 
created), (Shaw, Curth, Alexandre, 2004; Maixé-Altés, 2009). 
From 1957 onwards the ministry of trade created various National Companies. The 
first of these was the Auxiliary Supply Company PLC. (Compañía Auxiliar de 
Abastecimientos S.A. (CABSA) in Spanish), which was to be the umbrella company for 
the public supermarket network. In spite of the modernity of the advanced infrastructure 
and the fact that these occupied a sales area of more than 1000 square meters, they 
constituted the exception rather than the rule in a retail environment in which private 
initiatives had yet to take off10. Shortly before, in an important trade fare the “Feria del 
Campo” in Madrid, a North American supermarket installation had had a great impact 
upon the public. However, this took place almost a decade after the Imperial Institute of 
London held a similar event. In this country, as in most other European countries, public 
initiatives held sway, but began to be influenced by the aid provided by the Anglo-
American Council of Productivity. Without any doubt, private initiatives came about 
much earlier in these countries than in Spain, particularly via the mass media and the 
economic press (Shaw, Curth, Alexandre, 2004). 
In the 1950’s Spanish food distribution took place through highly traditional 
channels. During this period Local Municipal wholesale markets formed the nuclei of 
sales to retailers in terms of the most important and readily consumed food stuffs. They 
were run by a tendered company and the traders had to pay a rent or cannon for the use 
of the stall.11 In the private arena, the wholesale sector was made up of storage firms 
that wholesaled to a wide range of retailers including shopkeepers, grocers and 
greengrocers, wine-sellers, bakers’ etc.     
At the end of the decade, ministerial restructuring, the entry of technocrats in the 
Franco government and the implementation of the Stabilization plan in 1959 had 
positive effects on the economy and upon the private sector. Private initiatives in self-
service outlets and in supermarkets began to really take off, which effectively relegated 
public participation to a secondary role. A similar situation occurred with respect to 
other kinds of infrastructures, such as the industrial refrigeration network. In this area 
private enterprises far outweighed those set up through official government channels, to 
such an extent that, until the mid seventies, when the wholesaler network MERCAS was 
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set up (for wholesale markets), public infrastructures did not appreciably improve with 
respect to distribution and warehousing facilities12. 
 
3. The Spanish Alternative and the Americanization of Food Distribution  
The term ‘Americanization’ has a wide range of meanings. In this analysis the 
expression is used in the widest of senses. That is, it refers to the introduction of modern 
management and organizational systems which, had their origins in the heart of the 
North American economy, but whose adoption by other countries spread through 
various different channels. In short, the objective of this study is to highlight the factors 
that were crucial to the establishment of the American model of food distribution in 
Spain13. 
The relative underdevelopment of the Spanish economy, the weakness of income 
levels and the institutional framework of the Franco dictatorship made the 
improvements in productivity that the American models aimed to facilitate, difficult to 
introduce. This was evident in food distribution in Spain. Businessmen and 
entrepreneurs needed to be reoriented, consumer behaviour had to be adequately 
channelled and per capita incomes needed to rise. Hence, in stark contrast to the 
processes taking place in other countries throughout developed Europe, Spain was to 
adapt rather more slowly to North American self-service and supermarket models.  
As O. Bjarnar and M. Kipping have highlighted, the implantation and spread of the 
new methods took place within the context of complex, specific models according to the 
national, regional and local contexts14. J. Zeitlin underlines certain barriers to 
Americanization in social, cultural, institutional and political terms. These barriers were 
to arise, both within the elite and the populous as a whole, and in certain cases they 
were less than enthusiastic about the new models of organization and management15. In 
the mid 1950’s reports by the European Productivity Agency with respect to The 
economic performance of self-service in Europe, stated that distribution had hardly ever 
been the focus of study or research in Europe16. In the case of Britain, during the post-
war period and part of the 1950’s, the debate continued to be waged as to whether self 
service outlets were useful for the British. However, the greater efficiency and lower 
prices of the system finally triumphed (Shaw, Curth, Alexandre, 2004).  In the case of 
Spain, the line of reasoning followed by J. Zeitlin is congruous with the analysis of J. L. 
García Ruiz when referring to the cultural resistance to certain models of a consumer 
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society in Spain in the 1950’s and early 60’s17. All of the above factors had the effect of 
making the process of Americanization much slower in Spain. 
Studies that look at Americanization in the Spanish economy, particularly in the 
manufacturing sector, emphasise the role played by certain transfers of knowledge made 
available by American aid (Guillén, 1994; Puig and Alvaro, 2004; Miranda, 2004; Puig, 
2003). However, there were other sources of modernization besides the U.S. which 
should not be overlooked. In short, there were three main routes via which the new 
management and retail distribution techniques came to be established in the food trade. 
These were; Change and adaptation linked to American aid, Emigration from Mexico 
and Cuba to Spain and, via Europe, particularly with respect to voluntary chains, 
especially SPAR. 
Firstly, the cooperation programme with the U.S. had various effects on the 
modernization of food distribution in Spain. Through the USTAPP there arose an 
intense movement that favoured the learning processes and the means and methods that 
were characteristic of North American business management.18 In Spain, the National 
Commission for Industrial Productivity (CNPI – Spanish acronym) was to act following 
the lead of other similar bodies created in Europe under the auspices of the Marshall 
Plan. Its influence began to take effect in the mid 1950’s. The CNPI, the Chambers of 
Commerce and the CAT itself initiated information programmes, and in particular, 
programmes aimed at promoting self-service outlets. The CNPI, in conjunction with the 
modernization processes that were taking place with respect to industrial activity, served 
to promote the learning of new commercial techniques. The programme was also aimed 
at food distributors19. Within this terrain, the Ministry of Commerce acted in harmony 
with North American initiatives. Further, in the private sector, there were independent 
initiatives. A particularly important example was The Barcelona Marketing Club, under 
the auspices of the American Chamber of Commerce (Barcelona)20. 
A second channel of modernization which also brought North American advances 
was an influx of Cuban and Mexican businessmen who set up in Spain in the 1950’s 
and 60’s. All of these arrived with wide-ranging experience and knowledge of North 
American distribution systems. Some of these businessmen had travelled to their 
neighbouring United States specifically in order to discover what the innovations used 
in the North American retail market were really all about. Their influence on Spanish 
commerce was very important, particularly because they applied new techniques and 
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systems of development to help derive a modern distribution system, both in the food 
and non-food sectors. 
Cuban emigration was especially influential. The best known cases do not belong to 
the area of food distribution. Three repatriated Cubans who have been well-studied 
were: Cesar Rodríguez, José Fernández and Ramón Areces who played key roles in the 
development of Spanish chains of department stores, specifically, Galerías Preciados 
and el Corte Inglés. These three individuals knew the inter-war North American 
distribution system thanks to the Cuban experience. They developed this model in post-
war Spain, and managed to firmly establish their stores in the country and are still doing 
healthy business today21.  
Another less well known case and one that directly affects the food distribution 
sector is that of the popular chain stores SIMAGO. This chain was established in 
Madrid in 1960 and had its own food department. The founders of the company were a 
group of Hispano-Cuban family members who returned to Spain after the Castro 
revolution. The share holders were José M. Mayorga, his brother in law Valeriano 
López and the wives of both, the sisters Gómez-Waddintong who belonged to a wealthy 
family of island burghers (SIMAGO was a partial acronym of Simó, Mayorga and 
Gómez). These entrepreneurs, like those cited previously, were capable of introducing 
highly innovative aspects of the retail distribution sector into Spain quite early on in the 
period analyzed.  
In 1963 the new SIMAGO stores adopted the model of the French chain Prisunic, 
via the participation of French executives in the management of the stores. It became a 
kind of ensign for a whole generation of Spanish, born into consumerism when the 
chain expanded throughout the country22. The owners cut their ties to the business at the 
end of the 1970’s which allowed new investors to take control in 1963. Those that took 
up seats on the board of directors were members of: Printemps-Prisunic, Crédit 
Agricole, the Spanish March Group (industrial and banking) and a few other banks23. 
This corporative movement made up the bridgehead for French distribution within the 
Spanish market24. 
In addition, a number of Mexican businessmen set up in Spain in the first half of the 
1970’s. Their influence on the modernization of Spanish distribution was not 
inconsiderable. The commercial model of the United States had been taken up in 
Mexico in 1947, when the retail chain Sears-Roebuck set up its first shop in Mexico 
city25. Although it did not specialize in food stuffs, the impact upon self service trade 
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and the novel marketing techniques it employed were significant. Within this context, 
the brothers Lorenzo and Roberto Servitjà, sons of Catalonian emigrants, formed joined 
forces with Jaime Jorba and José Mata in order to set up the industrial bakers and bread 
makers Bimbo S.A. (plc.) in 1945. The successful model of distribution helped them to 
cover the Mexican market in a relatively short time with the products of their factories. 
In 1962, Jaime Jorba moved to Spain where the same model of production and 
distribution for “Bimbo” was highly successful. Several years later in 1978, he sold his 
shares to his partners and the firm became independent from the Mexican Holding 
company26.  
A further case with origins in Mexico, one which is directly related to food 
distribution, is that of the Arango family and the “Aurreá” supermarkets. In 1958 the 
Jerónimo brothers, Plácido and Manuel Arango Arias, sons of an Asturian emigrant 
who had found success in the Mexican textile market, opened their first self-service and 
discount store in Mexico. Jerónimo Arango was familiar with the discount stores in 
NewYork and applied the same model in Mexico. These entrepreneurs broadened their 
business base and opened a chain of restaurants, which they called VIPS, in México and 
various other franchises. Finally, in the 1990’s they sold their outlets to the North 
American chain store Wal-Mart Inc. Plácido Araujo set up in Spain in 1965 and opened 
the new Aurreá supermarkets, in line with the model of the supermarkets established in 
Mexico. The shops enjoyed great success and, during a decade, they represented one of 
the most modern supermarket chains in Spain. In 1975 these establishments were sold 
to Galerías Preciados and hence entered the food distribution sector. For his part, the 
Mexican entrepreneur reoriented his business towards the restaurant trade (Grupo 
VIPS)27. 
In contrast to the UK, the presence of American businesses in the food distribution 
sector in Spain, via FDI activity in Spanish food retailing, was non-existent. In the UK, 
US methods had already been taken up in the inter-war period with the American 
company Woolworths and the acquisition of Boots by Liggett (Shaw, Curth, Alexandre, 
2004). After the war, Safeway and Fine Fare contributed to the transformation of British 
retailing and, at the beginning of the 1960’s, there was notable investment in new 
supermarkets from the Canadian business empire of the Weston family (Davies, 1987). 
In Spain, outside of the food industry, Sears was highly representative of the non-food 
sector, which they entered in the 1960’s, and were strictly faithful to the American 
model in successfully setting up a chain of Department Stores and electrical goods 
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shops (Maixé-Altés, 2009). There were also specially organised visits to the US from 
Spain, financed by the USTAPP as there were for other European countries. However, 
the transatlantic contacts, on the part of the Spanish experts and businessmen failed to 
generate positive effects to match those that came about as a result of the Inter-locking 
directorships that became crucial to UK success in enabling knowledge transfers (Shaw 
and Alexandre, 2006). 
Finally, the role of the voluntary chains should also be highlighted. These had a 
strong impact on the whole of the Spanish market and are dealt with in more detail in 
the following section. These channels favoured contacts among a select group of 
Spanish entrepreneurs with the more highly developed sectors of the European food 
distribution network. Without a doubt, the influence on wholesale management, retailers 
and on consumer behaviour was extremely important. For quite a long time this 
segment was led by SPAR Española S.A., a company that was set up in 1959 and linked 
to a chain of Dutch origins of the same name. After the implantation of SPAR, the 
1960’s then saw the arrival of the Dutch chain Végé. In 1967 the chains IFA and IGA 
also established themselves, shortly after which a further two Dutch firms CENTRA 
and Dima also set up (the latter in 1969, in the hardware store sector)28. 
On establishing the layout for the network of influences for modern Spanish food 
distribution, we now proceed to situate local initiatives within the context of this 
network. Some of the multiple retailers, those that became key players in the sector in 
the 1980’s, took their first steps at the end of the 1950’s and the beginning of the 60’s. 
However, with the exception of SIMAGO, the grocery multiples were highly local in 
nature during the 1970’s. It was not until the 70’s or even the 80’s when some 
supermarket companies began to look further afield and expand beyond their local 
territories. Most of these chains of supermarkets took the step from local to regional and 
regional to national in the 80’s and 90’s. It should be stressed that this territorial 
expansion took place much later than in other European countries. This was 
undoubtedly due to the weakness and relative scarcity of capital and difficulties within 
the market itself that was slow modernize. 
Both the co-operatives and the retail buying groups were to have a marked impact 
on the development of the retail sector in Spain. The co-operative societies, which in 
some areas were very traditional organisations, fell into two camps; the most traditional, 
which failed to adapt to the needs the time and failed to react to the changing climate of 
retail distribution and, a minority that modernized and became more efficient29. G. 
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Shaw and A. Alexander on analyzing the British case, underline the role of innovator 
that some of the cooperatives had in the immediate post war period in the early days of 
the self service revolution30. However, in Spain their influence took hold much later and 
they did not enjoy the early leadership of their British counterparts. Nevertheless, from 
the 1980’s onwards this leadership eventually came to the fore within some 
cooperatives in Spain. Without a doubt the most salient of these is the Eroski Group, 
currently in the vanguard of Spanish food distribution  and a member of the strategic 
European alliance ALIDIS. 
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
A prominent example of such a cooperative in Spain was the Madrilenian 
organisation, DUCPRA, set up in 1931, and which went through a serious crisis after 
the civil war. By the end of the 50’s it had managed to recover and became fully 
operational before becoming GRUMA, led by Gregorio Sánchez Herráez31 in 1964.  
This company became integral to the UNIDE group which was set up in 1993, a group 
that involved the merger of various cooperatives throughout the whole of Spain, and 
which later became allied to Eroski. Around about the same time, Coviran, the 
Andalusian cooperative set up in Granada en 1961 was founded32. The aforementioned 
Eroski Group was set up as a cooperative in 1969 and the Valencian cooperative 
Consum somewhat later, in 1975. 
In general, at the beginning of the 1960’s, the European food trade differed greatly 
from one country to another, depending on the type of company operating in the sector 
(see table 1). The multiple retailers that led the British market also maintained a 
presence in Holland and Germany. Sweden and the UK were the two countries with the 
greatest cooperative tradition in the sector, while the voluntary chains were important in 
the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. Finally, the countries with the most traditional 
trading systems in food were Spain and Italy. In fact, these countries were characterized 
by a majority of unaffiliated independents which predominated over other kinds of 
organizations, and in these the development of self-service outlets and supermarkets 
was very slow (table 1). 
 
4. Voluntary chains and the growing success of smaller self-service stores, 1959-
1972 
The voluntary chain SPAR was founded in 1932 in Zoetemer (Holland). In a very short 
period of time this pioneer had become a leader in associate retail trade in Europe. It 
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would not be an exaggeration to affirm that this leading chain helped to propagate the 
franchise system throughout the world33. Shortly afterwards, also in Holland, the 
storage company owner, D. Schuitema created the voluntary chain CENTRA. The 
Second World War had recently begun and eleven storage and warehousing companies 
(Mazon-Group) were created Verkoops Gemeenschap (VéGé). In 1942 the fourth 
voluntary chain was set up: Vrijiwllie Inkoop- en Verkoop Organisatie (VIVO). Until 
1947 this new system of commercial association was unheard of outside Holland. 
Subsequently, the model spread first to Belgium and then, after 1953 to various 
European countries. That year, during the second AIDA (International Conference of 
Food Trade) in Ostend, it would be true to say that the voluntary chains, particularly 
SPAR, Began to become a common feature of European distribution34. In 1960 SPAR 
had successfully established itself in ten European countries (239 distribution centres 
and more than 32398 affiliated outlets) (table 2). Six years later, the number of retailers 
affiliated to SPAR in sixteen European countries represented 31.7 per cent of the 
116231 affiliates to the five big chains (SPAR, VéGé, CENTRA, VIVO and A & O)35. 
In Great Britain, Charles K. Green from Manchester and E. K. Edwards from 
Shrewsbury, after attending the AIDA congress in Ostend took the first steps in the 
creation of SPAR (England). The process reached fruition on 9th October 1956. After 
only four years, 3029 British retailers were to have 30 distribution centres (Table 2). A 
little later in 1965 the SPAR central office in the UK agreed to supply other voluntary 
chains from a central location, and in this way the SPAR-VIVO organisation was 
founded36. In 1966 the number of retailers affiliated to the different British voluntary 
chains was approximately 10100, the same number of affiliates that existed in Spain at 
the same time, this somewhat striking difference residing in the fact that the British 
population doubled that of Spain37. 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
The entry of SPAR in Spain revolutionized the small retail outlet market. The SPAR 
movement was highly suited to the orientation of many Spanish entrepreneurs in the 
distribution sector. One group opted for the franchise model of distribution. This group, 
which took its first steps in 1959, contained individuals who were to become some of 
the most important businessmen in the sector at the end of the 20th century. These 
included the Pascual brothers and Elosúa family and, in the Castile-Leon area38, Ventura 
Gonzalez and A. Tabarés in Galicia (currently, Vegalsa-Eroski), Rubiras in Catalonia, 
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Marsal en Valencia, Fernández de Cossío in Madrid and Sainz in Seville (Abeto, S.A.), 
all of whom were among the founders of SPAR Española, S.A. (PLC)39.  
The European SPAR organization strongly supported the efforts of the Spanish 
promoters. The warehouses belonging to Hans Bayer de Viernheim bei Mannheim 
(Baden-Württemberg) in Germany, via his manager G. Koschwitz, played a very 
important role in an advisory capacity, helping the Spanish SPAR organization to get 
off the ground. In fact, the SPAR annual board meeting in Europe was held in Madrid, 
and coincided with the inauguration of the Spanish SPAR organisation on 1st of May 
196040. There were very significant knowledge and technology transfers at the heart of 
these contacts. The businessmen involved visited the storage facilities of their European 
colleagues and were able to discover key aspects of modern food distribution41. The 
businessmen involved at the end of the 50’s and the early 60’s were well aware of the 
role that food distribution had to play in a modern economy. In this sense the words of 
A. Ortiz de Zárate, the director general of SPAR Española, S.A at the end of the 1960’s 
are most poignant: 
It is essential that everyone cooperates in solving one of the main problems for 
Spain, that of reducing food spending as a proportion of national income over the 
following 5 or 6 years […] not only would the country as whole and its consumers 
benefit, but also all the other industries and trades, which would enjoy a higher 
percentage of national income for other non-food related activities, Ortiz de Zárate 
(1960-1961).  
 
SPAR Española was the first national initiative in the private sector which had the 
capacity to make the organisational structure and the food distribution strategies in 
Spain more dynamic. The voluntary chains embraced the independent outlets with the 
object of obtaining higher levels of organisation and profitability. The management of 
the latter affected both the wholesale and retail segments of the food distribution sector. 
From the point of view of the old warehousing companies, the new organisational 
design, which was based upon distribution centres, meant that they had to undergo an 
intense process of rationalisation with respect to aforesaid distribution. The dispersion 
of costs that was intrinsic to the traditional method of supply was replaced by a new 
method that was to concentrate resources. This provided a means of eliminating the 
multiplicity of transactions and of creating economies of scale. The Spanish SPAR 
began to incorporate wholesale practices that had already been tried and tested in other 
European countries. In fact, the European branches of SPAR were adapting to the new 
goals and opportunities that had become available through the creation of the Common 
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Market. In mid June 1960 the directors of the commercial departments of the European 
branches of the company met in Brussels in order to plan the future of joint international 
operations. Their objective was to prepare the creation of an international buying 
centre42.  
At the other end of the commercial spectrum of the distribution process was the 
retailer who acquired his stocks from the SPAR distribution centre. The goal of the 
retailer was to reach the final consumer. The retailers paid the central distributor in cash, 
and in so doing were able to benefit from the discounts that were available (charges 
were regressive depending on the monetary weight of purchases, and in accordance with 
a progressive scale of concentration, and in line with a price regime that had been 
established for all of the associates). These coefficients referred to the costs of 
distribution relative to the volume of the retailer’s weekly purchases in the distribution 
centre43. The strategy was in keeping with an imperative need to maintain price 
competitiveness in sales to the public. The independence of the retailers was inviolable 
and there was no formal agreement with the SPAR distribution centre. Each distribution 
centre had a board of retailers that oriented the commercial and marketing policy in line 
with the needs of the area, which reinforced the spirit of cooperation among the 
associates. 
In 1959 there were only 14 self-service retail outlets in Spain, but from then on the 
implantation of this type of shop was relentless. In 1960, according to the CAT 77 new 
establishments of this type were created, in 1965 449 and in 1970 1,07844. At the end of 
1960 the SPAR retail model formed the umbrella for 31 distribution centres which 
covered 70% of the whole of Spain. These centres provided for 2,000 retailers of all 
kinds and had an average sales area of between 30 and 250 square metres, of which only 
8 were over 100 square metres and one hundred were self-service outlets. One year later 
the number of self-service outlets had tripled, 17 of which were over 100 square metres 
and 5 with a sales area of over 200 square metres45. Of the 600 self-service outlets that 
existed in Spain at this date, half were serviced by the Spanish branch of the SPAR 
organisation.  
The divergence between Spain and the rest of Europe was still very great given that, 
in Spain, in the early 1960’s only 1.5% of food sales took place in self-service shops. 
The most advanced country in Europe in this context was Sweden (43%), followed by 
Germany (27%), Switzerland (25%) and Holland (24%). Even further ahead were the 
USA and Canada which led the world in this type of retail system (84% and 70% 
 15
respectively)46. In short, when the first small self-service retail shops began trading in 
Spain in the early 60’S, backed by the voluntary chains, in the UK the future of the 
larger self-service stores and by extension the supermarket system itself was already 
safely established. The new thrust in retail systems came not only from the cooperatives 
but also from multiple retailers who had also taken the initiative. In particular the 
Western group, with close ties to the US, which controlled Finefare, Coopers and 
Burtons, together with Tesco, London & Newcastle, Elmo, Premier and Sainsbury’s 
(Shaw, Curth, Alexandre, 2004). 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
In sociological terms Spain was witnessing the birth of a new retail distribution 
technique, which was embodied in the self service outlet. Its influence on consumer 
behaviour and habits was to be substantial following decades of stagnancy in retail 
development. The small Spanish self-service outlet was long-lived. Quantitatively it 
prevailed when competing against superstores and supermarkets during the 70’s and a 
large part of the 80’s (see table 3)47. The traditional shop took a long time to succumb to 
the dominance of the new types of outlet. By looking at the consumer statistics it is 
possible to obtain a good overview of the evolution of commercial formats. In 1973 the 
traditional grocery store was becoming progressively less important. However, by 
taking into consideration the shops specializing in dairy products, small-scale bakeries 
wine sellers and other kinds of shops, it can be seen that these still accounted for more 
than half of all retail establishments. It was not until the 1980’s that there was a change 
in this trend. At this time modern sales establishment was to account for approximately 
half of all those that existed (table 3). These data demonstrate the slow rate of 
modernization in Spanish commercial structures and the difficulties experienced in 
converging with the rest of Europe in the 60’s and 70’s. 
In this sense it would be useful to know the extent of the role of the Spanish SPAR 
organization in preparing retail entrepreneurs working in both the food and hardware 
sectors. The magazine published by this voluntary chain, Sparco, played an important 
part in disseminating information among retail traders. It provided a channel via which 
Spanish retailers had access to a culture of commerce which was lacking at the time. 
The magazine was markedly informative in tone and introduced concepts that SPAR 
had already been developing in Europe since the 1930’s. With flexibility as a byword, 
the philosophy of business efficiency was introduced, together with the management 
and marketing techniques that were unheard of in Spain in the post-war period48. It was 
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undoubtedly the area of “productivity” that was to generate most interest. This interest 
was reinforced by data and statistics that analyzed labour productivity and productivity 
in general, comparing self-service outlets and traditional shops49. There was a clear 
move towards “training and commercial preparation”, and this threw the impact of 
training courses and the directives of the local and regional groups into sharp relief. 
At the end of the 1960’s associated trade, particularly the voluntary chains, began to 
be sensitive to the need to adopt a management system similar to that of the corporate 
chains50. The development of mass consumption led the Spanish distribution system to a 
crossroads in commercial development. The editorial published by the Spanish organ of 
communication of SPAR in January 1967 was highly significant: 
Those organizations that are linked to the retail traders fulfil and will continue to 
fulfil vital role in the distribution of food, but, they will have to become 
progressively more structured, in line with the demands of branch-trading, more 
disciplined, following the norms that originate from higher up in the organisational 
structure and will benefit from the overwhelming efficiency of vertical companies 
(Sparco, 83 (1967), p. 5). 
 
These comments were laden with foresight given that it was precisely the lack of 
discipline and uniformity of criteria that was to transform the collaboration among the 
associate members into pure rhetoric and theory on many occasions. In a market that 
was ever more competitive, the advantages of vertical groups were considerable. The 
efficiency of the system was evident in the centralized buying systems, sales and 
administration, following uniform, systematic patterns that guaranteed results. These 
were features of the voluntary chains had to leave in the hands of their associates. 
The golden age of the big European voluntary chains was at an end. Although SPAR 
maintained its presence in the European market, the large vertically orientated 
supermarket and hypermarket firms came to the fore in every country51. In the end the 
Spanish distribution market was to enter an era of mass distribution during the 1970’s 
and it was to be the hypermarkets opened by the foreign multinationals which 
revolutionized the sector (Maixé-Altés, 2009).  
In the area of public policy there were certain changes at the end of the 70’s. The 
start of the first 4-year period of the Second Development Plan (1968-1971), was to 
signal greater governmental involvement in commercial policy and home trade. The 
First Development Plan practically ignored the food distribution sector. However, the 
new plan specified that: “particular attention will be paid to the commercialization of 
food products which constitute a fundamental factor in the equilibrium of the system”. 
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Governmental policy objectives were to include the development of competition, the 
creation of large-scale wholesale and consumer markets, improvements in the 
refrigeration network, reinforcing the wholesale network, improvements in the 
provision of commercial information to producers and distributors, quality, legislative 
coordination and support to consumer groups.  
The network of MERCAS signalled a strong move on the part of the state towards 
strengthening the logistical infrastructure of national food distribution52. The creation of 
MERCASA attempted to put an end to the deficiencies in the networks of food 
commercialization, particularly with respect to perishable goods53. This governmental 
initiative had already taken place in France ten years earlier with the inauguration of the 
Marchés d’Interet Nationaux network. In Italy, Germany and Great Britain the 
wholesale markets were organized around the local urban authorities54. The creation of 
this powerful public network in Spain generated important synergies in the last decade 
of the 20th Century55. 
 
5. Conclusions 
At the beginning of the 1960’s the food trade in Europe varied greatly in the way that it 
was organized from an entrepreneurial point of view. The new forms of retail 
distribution at this time were being carried out by multiple retailers which, in countries 
like the UK, the Netherlands and Germany led the self-service and the supermarket 
revolution. The cooperative organizations were still important in Europe and those in 
the Nordic countries were particularly prominent while countries like the UK pioneered 
the application of self service techniques in the immediate post war period. The 
voluntary chains maintained the weight of their presence via their buying centres, 
particularly in the Netherlands and Germany. Curiously, these were to prove to be the 
ideal tool of modernization in countries that were less developed, countries in which the 
lack of capital made the development of the corporate chains more difficult. This is 
precisely what happened in Spain. 
The empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis that O. Bjarnar and M. Kipping put 
forward with respect to the idiosyncratic patterns of the spread of Americanization. The 
Spanish road to change may be considered to be the result of a combination of various 
influences. These contributed to the slow rise of the North American management 
systems and the consolidation of self service outlets and the supermarkets within 
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Spanish food retailing. North American aid and links to Latin-America represent the 
transatlantic face of these influences. However, in the case of Spain, the European 
influence was most potent. In this sense, the role of certain pioneering Spanish 
entrepreneurs was of fundamental importance. They made it their business to familiarize 
themselves with the new techniques and the models of retail distribution that were 
already successful in much of the rest of Europe.  
The role of the voluntary chains should be highlighted since they created a general 
impetus, which made it possible to galvanize initiatives both within the wholesale and 
retail sectors. The dynamism of the first period of SPAR and other associate chains of 
traders has been under evaluated, particularly if one takes into consideration their 
contribution to the training and formation of a whole generation of wholesalers, retailers 
and consumers. The voluntary chains had a heavy impact on the Spanish market during 
the 1960’s and part of the 70’s. This situation reflects the efficiency of a business model 
which was well adapted to the conditions of a backward economy like Spain’s. In most 
of Europe the large, vertical, highly capitalized firms predominated, and these were run 
by durable management systems. In Spain, this dynamic came to the fore only in the 
80’s. To a certain extent, this transition was harnessed to the progress of the voluntary 
chains. 
The British model formed part of a more highly developed business model, one 
which was more highly capitalized and where the North American system penetrated 
much faster and did not have to overcome such difficult obstacles. Without a doubt, in 
the case of this particular neighbour, the traditional transatlantic relationship, had had a 
greater impact in the UK than in the rest of Europe. This situation contrasts sharply with 
that of Spain and, in particular, certain entrepreneurs who successfully developed a 
network of intra-European contacts in spite of the unfavourable institutional framework 
of the Franco regime. 
The big difference between the development of the British and Spanish systems 
during the early stages of self-service revolution was due to the difference in the 
availability of capital given the distinct levels of openness in the two economies. With 
respect to the mechanisms by which the new retail approaches spread there are elements 
that are common to both of the countries such as North American aid and governmental 
support. The differences, on the other hand, stem from the fact that the business 
response varied in the two countries. In Britain the need to develop new, more efficient 
methods of distribution was a consequence of the expansion of the economy. This goes 
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a long way to explaining the growth in the number of vertical business organisations in 
the UK. In Spain on the other hand, the associated trade system facilitated the 
modernization of the structures of the food trade during an initial period in which less 
capital was required. 
The final step towards the modern system of distribution, that is the introduction of 
the hypermarket and the expansion of the big supermarket chains, did not occur in Spain 
until the arrival of the French multinationals in the 1970’s. The only precursor to these 
powerful corporative groups was SIMAGO, set up initially with Spanish capital but 
soon to become the bridgehead of French investment in Spain. The arrival of French 
hypermarkets was a salutary shock to the Spanish retail system. Over the 1970’s there 
were various key phenomena: first, the distribution multinationals adjusted their 
approach to be consistent with Spanish markets; second, the local retailers began to 
expand and occupy regional areas and, third, associated trade began to become aware 
that it needed to modify its management systems in line with those of the vertical 
groups which were much more efficient. It was the latter that really signalled the start of 
the retailing revolution in Spanish food distribution. 
A look at recent English and American academic literature suggests that the 
historical gap between Spain and developed Europe is diminishing56. The immediate 
post civil war years and the following decade of isolationism had markedly negative 
effects for the sector. However, entrepreneurial dynamism originating in the 1960’s was 
able to alter the blinkered outlook of governmental policy which involved much state 
intervention and ignored the dictates of the market. To a certain extent, the fact that 
Spain was a late-comer to modern food distribution markets made it easier and faster to 
incorporate new technology throughout the 60’s and 70’s given that it was starting from 
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TABLE 1  
PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL FOOD MARKET ACCORDING TO DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
IN 1962 
(percentage) 
  Netherlands Belgium Germany Austria UK Sweden Spain Italy Finland 
Multiple retailers 21.7 5.5 14.2 4.0 29.0 3.9 1.0 2.0 - 
Retailer co-operatives 7.0 5.6 10.0 12.0 19.0 29.1 0.5 1.0 25.0 
Buyer organisations 6.7 - 28.6 14.0 16.0 35.0 2.0 0.3 25.0 
Voluntary chains 54.0 11.3 41.5 36.0 15.0 6.4 8.0 1.3 22.5 
Department stores 1.1 6.3 2.5 1.0 - 2.4 - - - 
Unaffiliated independents 9.5 71.3 3.2 33.0 21.0 23.2 88.5 95.4 27.5 
Source: Sparco (1964), 53, p.8 
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France  61 6 723 Austria 14 1 671 
Western Germany 52 11 750 Italy 11 919 
UK 30 3 029 Belgium 9 1 401 
Spain 31 3 030 Denmark 8 925 
Netherlands 15 2 110 Sweden 8 840 




PROPORTION OF RETAIL FOOD TRADERS ACCORDING TO TYPE OF OUTLET AS A 
MEASURE OF HOUSEHOLD FOOD CONSUMPTION ESPAÑA, 1963-1983 
(percentage) 
  1963 1973 1983 
Food outlets 61 36 15 
Hypermarket, Supermarket and Self services 8 19 50 
Co-operatives 6 9 7 
Dairies, Bakeries and others 12 18 13 
Bars, Wine stores, Cafes and others 13 18 15 
Source: Consumer Panel DYM-PANEL and Sparco, 191 (1976), p.  9. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Sparco (1960), 11, p. 3. 
2 Ibidem. 
3 Multiple retailers are usually the natural result of successful traders opening new shops until these 
become a chain. They  constitute an example of commerce integrated horizontally. 
4 Pérez González (2002), p. 82; Barciela and López Ortiz (2003), Calvo (2001), González (1977). 
5 See Gago González (2007), pp. 27-50 for a view of the legal framework of post war trade. 
6 Viñas (1981, p. 55) is in agreement with the opinion of the democratic senator Pat McCarran and a 
diverse group of congressmen on the role of aid to Spain.  
7 Between 1960 and 1995 this percentage fell to a third of the original figure, see Prados (2003), 
Appendix, 6, 12 y 13 y CNEe-86 en Uriel et al. (2000). 
8 Calvo (2001). 
9 Gago González (2007), p. 71. 
10 Before the end of the decade, supermarkets were already up and running in San Sebastian, Bilbao, 
Gijon, A Corunna, Barcelona, Madrid, Zaragoza and Valencia. They differed greatly with respect to their 
foreign counterparts: in the USA the typical supermarket had about 1200 square metres of sales area, 
while in Great Britain the first self service Sainsbury’s supermarket had 300 metres (Shaw, Curth, 
Alexandre, 2004), and in 1967 the average supermarket had 500 square metres of sales area (Alexander, 
2008). 
11 After the civil war a large number of markets were built or rebuilt, Gago González (2007), pp. 77, 79.  
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